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Abstract. Case-based reasoning (CBR) has been viewed by many as
just a methodology for building systems, but the foundations of CBR
are psychological theories. Dynamic Memory (Schank, 1982) was the
rst attempt to describe a theory for learning in computers and peo-
ple, based on particular forms of data structures and processes, that
nowadays are widely used in a variety of forms in CBR. In addition to
being useful for system building, CBR provides a way of discussing a
range of issues concerned with cognition. This focus on the practical
uses of CBR has de
ected attention from the need to develop further the
underlying theory. In particular, the issue of knowledge acquisition, in
not adequately handled by the existing theory. This paper discusses this
theoretical weakness and then proposes an enhanced model of learning
which is compatible with the CBR paradigm.
1 Introduction
In recent years, CBR has been gaining ground in the machine learning arena.
Unfortunately, the interest has been mostly concentrated in categorisation tasks;
several very successful CBR programs have been developed to date under this
line of research; one example is PROTOS (Bareiss, 1989), an exemplar-based
learner (see Gentner, 1989; Redmond, 1989) based on psychological theories of
concept learning and classication (see Medin and Smith, 1984; Van Mechelen,
et al., 1993; Rosch, 1978). However, there are additional possibilities for learning
within CBR (Schank, et al., 1986; Burstain, 1986), and there are many avenues
for research.
2 Acquisition of Events
One issue of CBR that should receive more attention is concerned with the acqui-
sition of knowledge because little is actually known. There are only a few known
theories on the acquisition of knowledge, and none of them are completely sat-
isfactory (see below). Variations of schemata-like structures are widely used to
represent acquired knowledge (e.g., plans by Abelson, 1973; scripts by Schank,
1975; frames by Minsky, 1975; schemata by Bobrow, 1975, and Rumelhart, 1980).
Some theorists, working in cognitive and computer sciences, assume that some
form of induction is used, but do not provide satisfactory accounts of it (ei-
ther because the accounts are incomplete, too loose, or because more details
need to be specied and proven). For example, Holyoak (1985) and Keane's
(1988) accounts of schemata acquisition are limited to the creation of schemata
by analogy; many other theorists remain suspiciously silent. Rumelhart (1980)
elaborated one of the most complete accounts (see also Rumelhart and Norman,
1981) on schema acquisition. Rumelhart and Norman's account is based in three
basic forms of schemata acquisition, which can be described as follows:
1. Accretion is the accumulation of `memory traces' or `traces of the compre-
hension process' upon having perceived some event or understood some text,
into the repertoire of knowledge.
2. Tuning involves the elaboration and renement of concepts in a schema
through continued experience. There are three kinds of tuning: (a) systematic
adjustment of variable constrains and default values, (b) concept generalisa-
tion, and (c) concept specialisation.
3. Restructuring involves the creation of new schemata either by induction
(through the repetition of a spatio temporal conguration of schemata) or by
analogy (mapping some aspects of an existing schema onto a novel situation,
noticing dierences and changing some of its attributes). This form involves
the actual development of new concepts.
These accounts of schemata learning work well once a schema is discretionar-
ily determined (already existent in memory), or elements or aspects of a schema
are identied; but, what is involved in learning new schemata from scratch, i.e.,
when no similar schema is already in memory? The only form of learning that
can deal with such a condition is schema induction. However, current schemata
theories (as those mentioned above) have problems dealing properly with induc-
tion because they make no provision for recognising recurrent congurations for
which a schema does not already exist in the system. Is this the reason why most
theorists prefer to remain silent on this issue? Practitioners tend to implement
some form of ad hoc or ill-dened method of induction when trying to tackle
this situation, which sometimes works, but obviously, those are specic solutions
to very limited domains. For example, a typical approach is to support the `in-
ductive' mechanism of a given system with some form of background knowledge
or with training examples.
Dynamic memory theory (Schank, 1982) is the starting point of case-based
reasoning, and is the foundation of this paradigm of cognition. In this the-
ory, scripts are one of the main structures used to explain the organisation
of episodic memory. However, other knowledge structures are also proposed, in-
cluding scenes, MOPs, Meta-MOPs, and TOPs. The acquisition of knowledge is
a more intricate process than is allowed for in plain schema theories. Dynamic
memory is an elaborate theory, intertwining several cognitive processes. Such a
theory inevitably leaves room for interpretation; more work is needed to articu-
late this paradigm. Furthermore, some theorists consider that dynamic memory
theory is incomplete and underspecied (Eysenck and Keane, 1995). This paper
tackles some of the problems encountered with dynamic memory as a learning
theory.
3 Dynamic Memory Weaknesses
There are some problems concerning conceptual aspects of dynamic memory
theory. Firstly, Schank argues that during the act of trying to understand an
experience (event), we are inevitably reminded of similar events, because in
order to recognise the closest previous experience, we have to retrieve related
memory structures, sometimes closely related to the event at hand, sometimes
only related by context. However, there is evidence (Seifert, et al., 1986; Seifert
and Hammond, 1989) that people do not always remember and utilise prior
experiences that are only abstractly related to the current situation in such a
\simple memory model of episode retrieval". People frequently fail to recall
specic memories at relevant times, and even further, people commonly
fail to get reminded of the closest or the most useful event when it is needed
to solve a problem { specially novices. It seems that the determining factor in
eective retrieval of events is the quality of the original encoding; and that
additionally, agreat deal of inference is required to fully understand an experience
containing abstract relations, required to improve the encoding. These ndings
are in line with previous predictions by Craik and Lockhart (1972), and Hyde
and Jenkins (1973) (both studies in Eysenck and Keane, 1995), whom proposed
that:
1. The level or depth of processing of a stimulus has substantial eects on its
memorability.
2. Deeper levels of analysis produce more elaborate, longer lasting, and stronger
memory traces than do shallow levels of analysis. Craik and Tulving's (1975)
experiments suggest that elaboration of processing of some kind and the
amount of elaboration are also important factors in determining long-term
memory.
Another criticism of dynamic memory theory stems from Schank's proposi-
tion of \automatic reminding". Schank argues that during the act of processing
an event, we are inevitably reminded of similar events. However, experimenta-
tion (Seifert et al., 1985) reported that when subjects experience an event, they
are not usually reminded of close events automatically. According with Seifert et
al.'s experiments, it seems that intentionality in recalling is a required ingre-
dient in the process of bringing up analogs from memory. Intentionality depends
on subject's strategies and task diculty.
4 An Enhanced Learning Model after Dynamic Memory
Due to limitations of space, it will be assumed that the reader has an under-
standing of the memory structures mentioned above (scripts, scenes, MOPs,
Meta-MOPs, and TOPs; for details see [Ramirez, 1997a]). The theory that is
presented below is based on dynamic memory theory (DMT); several modica-
tions and enhancements have been carried out, the resultant theory is presented
as follows:
(a) Recognition and recall. When a event is experienced, like <coming into
a fast-food restaurant>, we try to recognise similar situations we have
experienced in the past, by noticing some similarities with the current
event. Recognition is a stage not considered in DMT at all, although
many cognitive scientists (see Watkins and Gardiner, 1979, for a review;
see also Tulving 1982, 1983) make a distinction here. The point is that a
memories are encoded together with a context, and this context is rele-
vant to the recognition process. Next to recognition comes the recalling
of the best match, as proposed in DMT; however, it is important to no-
tice that the eectiveness of the recalling process depends on individual
strategies (e.g., which features of the event are observed{salient or dis-
tinctive features usually make the best indices or `memory traces'; kinds
of associations among elements of the events, etc.), and on the form of
retention that was used for the encoding and storing (depth, elabora-
tion, and distinctiveness). These two, \individual strategies" and \form
of retention" are factors that Schank overlooked.
In more practical terms, if it is assumed that similar events are stored
in a specic `neighbourhood', then recognition means the localisation of
that neighbourhood, taking advantage of common context. Recall is the
process of retrieving the closest event.
(b) Recollection and reminding. During the process of recalling, we might be
reminded of particular experiences, as pointed out in DMT, because the
structures we use to process the new experience are the same structures
we use to organise memories. However, Schank assumed that we are in-
evitably reminded of similar events, but evidence (see above) shows that
reminding depends on intentionality{which is concerned with analogical
strategies. What is remarkable here, is that memory structures for stor-
age, and processing structures for analysis of inputs are the same ones.
Therefore, it is not surprising that we may be \reminded" of similar
events when processing a new one.
(c) Reconstructing and Understanding. Several cognitive processes are deeply
intertwined in this theory: recalling and understanding are actually part
of the same process. Understanding an event{been able to process an
event accordingly to a expected outcome{begins when we start trying to
recall previous similar memory events to the one at hand. Finding the
`right' one (i.e., the closest) means getting closer to the understanding of
the experience. Schank makes an attractive remark that ts well at this
point (1982, p.110): \A great deal of our ability to be creative and novel
in our understanding is due to our ability to see connections between
events and to draw parallels between events". This process of `mapping
events' is particularly interesting when it is done at the highest level
(i.e., drawing analogies among TOPs or MOPs), because analogies can
be done between domains or simply can be more signicant in the same
domain.
Therefore, we try to understand the current experience by reconstruct-
ing the recalled similar experience, or at least a signicant part of it (the
part that allows the understanding of the current part of the current
event), by accessing the corresponding memory structures that organised
it (i.e., scripts, scenes, or MOPs). An event is composed by sequences
of situations{separable elements of the event{organised by those struc-
tures. If a close enough event does not exist in memory, then we may
have to resort to foreign domain analogue events, by accessing TOPs;
process that involves additional mechanisms. The above explanation of
the understanding process may dier considerably from Schank's, since
his presentation is of a more higher level, and is not well explained how
recalled events are processed.
(d) Expectations. Once an event has been reconstructed, expectations about
subsequent situations of the recalled event are automatically brought up.
Therefore, it is possible to bring up situations, from the old event, that
are likely to occur in the current one. This action can be used to predict
situations as the current event progresses, that is, situations that still
have not taken place, but that are part of the old event.
(e) Expectation evaluation. As the event progresses, some of the predicted
situations may not take place (since the current event may dier from
the recalled one); however, if most of the recalled expectations match the
situations of the event at hand, then no modications (or minor ones) to
memory structures are carried out; clearly, very little or nothing is then
learnt from the experience.
(f) Explanation of expectation failures. If some of the expectations (of situ-
ations) are not satised because the current experience diers too much
from the old one, then the possibility of explaining those failures brings
new opportunities for learning by modifyingmemory structures or creat-
ing new ones. Then, memory is organised in terms of explanations that
are created to help to understand the dierences between what is expe-
rienced and what is expected to experience. In DMT, Schank does not
explain what it means for an experience to dier by \too much" from
one stored in memory. What is proposed here is that those dierences
are concerned with aspects of beliefs, and hence, with condence factors.
The condence factors are attached to the attributes of the schemata re-
lated to the events, and they are evaluated through the application of a
similarity function. The condence factors are modied on the basis of
the frequency of use, and the eectiveness of the associated attributes,
the higher the usage (provided that the outcome was positive), the higher
condence of the attribute.
(g) Learning. Having had an expectation failure, and having explained it,
the individual is then in the position of modifying his memory struc-
tures in some way. But in what way? The question is not an easy one:
it is not clear why every individual encodes his or her experiences dif-
ferently. Schank again does not discuss this point. Here, it is suggested
again that the beliefs of an individual are the grounds for his or her mem-
ory organisation, because memory modications are determined by the
explanations that an individual may provide as a response to encounter-
ing expectation failures during the processing of any event. As beliefs are
non-concensual and have associated condences, the most obvious impli-
cation is that every individual, although exposed to the same experience,
will encode it dierently. Thus, learning occurs when memory structures
are modied, either by adding new structures when new experiences are
encountered, or by changing old ones when similar experiences are met.
It is now possible to see how several cognitive processes are deeply inter-
twined: recalling, understanding, learning, and explaining can not be separated
from each other because they are part of the same process. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of the process. Schank makes a nal interesting remark on under-
standing, he says that \we understand in terms of the structures that we have
available, and those structures re
ect how we have understood things in the
past. Then, we see things in terms of what we have already experienced". This
remark is an evident conclusion after points (c) and (g).
To conclude this paper, it should be mention that work is been carried out on
the implementation of a CBR system applied to information retrieval. This is, in
part, an evaluation of the theory proposed here (see Ramirez, 1997b, for details
of the system). In particular, the elements of the system most strongly in
uenced
by the theory are: recognition, recollection and reminding, and learning.
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Fig. 1. A Conceptual Model of Episodic Memory Learning
